The following material discusses the usage of valuation template using principles of value investing and the economic logic behind estimating the worth of a business. It is provided solely for educational and informational purposes.
We can apply the template we have introduced here to real cases.
Reference Date: November 28, 2025.
Salesforce is a large enterprise cloud software company focused on customer relationship management and related applications in sales, service, marketing, commerce, analytics, data and AI. It positions itself as the “#1 AI CRM”, offering a unified platform (Customer 360, Agentforce, Data Cloud, Slack, etc.) that integrates customer data and workflows across the enterprise.
From a value-investing perspective, Salesforce is interesting because:
The key question is whether current cash generation and growth justify a valuation above or below today’s market price.
For the latest twelve-month free cash flow (FCF), public sources report free cash flow for fiscal 2025 around 12.4–12.5 billion, with trailing-twelve-month (TTM) FCF in mid-2025 also about 12.5 billion. We will use:
\text{FCF}_{0} \approx 12.5 \ \text{billion}
Recent filings and data sources show total common shares outstanding at filing date around 952 million:
\text{Shares} \approx 952\ \text{million}
Recent analysis indicates Salesforce holds substantially more cash than debt, with net cash around 6.9 billion.
For simplicity, we treat the business as effectively unlevered and do not separately adjust for net cash in the core DCF. We can always add net cash per share to the equity value.
We apply the three-stage free-cash-flow model described in the framework.
We discount all cash flows at a required return r that reflects a long term equity hurdle for a high-quality large-cap business.
For a large, established, high-margin software company with net cash, a common value-investing choice is:
r_f \approx 4% \text{ to } 4.5%
We add an equity risk premium plus specific business risk.
For this CRM analysis we will use:
Conceptually:
r = r_f + \text{Risk Premium}
with r_f \approx 4% and \text{Risk Premium} between 5% and 7% depending on the scenario.
We now define three explicit scenarios: bearish, base and bullish.
Using \text{FCF}_{0} = 12.5\ \text{billion} and \text{Shares} = 952\ \text{million}:
Bearish scenario
Base scenario
Bullish scenario
These are not forecasts, just structured assumptions that allow us to evaluate a range of outcomes.
As we can later use the same discount factor for company which we assume have a similar growth profile, we will compute using the formula:
\text{PV} = \text{FCF}_{0} \cdot K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r)
where the DCF factor per 1 unit of current FCF is:
\begin{aligned} & K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r) = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \\ & K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \end{aligned}
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} = 4.61
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} = 3.60
Terminal discount value at t = 10:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} = 7.59
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty = 15.80
Discount all cash flows at r = 11% gives the firm value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bearish}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K = 12 \ \text{billion} \times 15.80 \approx 198\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bearish}} \approx \frac{198\ \text{B}}{952\ \text{M}} \approx 207
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} = 5.00
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} = 4.48
Terminal discount value at t = 10:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} = 12.23
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty = 21.71
Discount all cash flows at r = 11% gives the firm value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Base}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K = 12 \ \text{billion} \times 21.71 \approx 271\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Base}} \approx \frac{271\ \text{B}}{952\ \text{M}} \approx 284\ \text{per share}
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} = 5.43
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} = 5.57
Terminal discount value at t = 10:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} = 20.58
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty = 31.58
Discount all cash flows at r = 11% gives the firm value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bullish}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K = 12 \ \text{billion} \times 21.71 \approx 395\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bullish}} \approx \frac{395\ \text{B}}{952\ \text{M}} \approx 413\ \text{per share}
Using the current share price (around 230.5 as of 2025-11-28) from the market snapshot above, we can compute the implied margin of safety in each scenario.
| Case | Intrinsic value per share | Current price | Margin of safety | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bearish | 207 | 230.5 | -12% | Price is above bearish value. |
| Base | 284 | 230.5 | +19% | Decent discount to base case. |
| Bullish | 413 | 230.5 | +44% | Large upside if bullish view holds. |
Margin of safety is defined as 1 - \text{Price} / \text{Intrinsic Value}, expressed as a percentage.
Some observations:
At the current price around 230, the stock trades:
In Graham / Buffett language, CRM looks like a quality compounder where a reasonable estimate of intrinsic value is materially above the current quote, but not so extreme that one should ignore business risk, competition and execution around AI and data.
Within this framework:
For a disciplined value investor, CRM at current prices can be framed as:
Reference Date: November 28, 2025.
Alphabet is the parent company of Google and one of the dominant platforms in search, online advertising, YouTube, Android, Chrome and cloud computing. It is also heavily investing in AI infrastructure (Gemini models, custom TPUs), data centers and associated hardware, as well as longer dated projects such as Waymo and other bets.
From a value-investing angle, Alphabet has several attractive features:
At the same time, the share price has appreciated sharply in 2025 on AI enthusiasm, pushing Alphabet toward the 3–4 trillion market cap zone.
The question is whether current free cash flow and realistic growth assumptions justify that level of valuation for a long term owner who demands an equity-like return, not a bond-like one.
Alphabet reported free cash flow for 2024 of roughly 72.8 billion:
\text{FCF}_{0} \approx 72.8 \ \text{billion}
Weighted-average diluted shares for 2024 are about 13.31\ \text{billion}:
\text{Shares} \approx 13.31\ \text{million}
Alphabet ended 2024 with around 96 billion in cash and marketable securities.
For simplicity, we treat the business as effectively unlevered and do not separately adjust for net cash in the core DCF. We can always add net cash per share to the equity value if we want that refinement.
We apply the three-stage free-cash-flow model described in the framework.
We discount all cash flows at a required return r that reflects a long term equity hurdle for a high-quality large-cap business.
For a large, established, high-margin software company with net cash, a common value-investing choice is:
r_f \approx 4% \text{ to } 4.5%
We apply an equity risk premium plus specific business risk.
For this GOOGL analysis we will use the same scenarios as CRM, so the CDF are the same and there is no need to recompute them:
We now define three explicit scenarios: bearish, base and bullish.
We will use \text{FCF}_{0} = 72.8\ \text{billion} and \text{Shares} = 13.31\ \text{billions}.
Bearish scenario
Base scenario
Bullish scenario
These are not forecasts, just structured assumptions that allow us to evaluate a range of outcomes.
As we can later use the same discount factor for company which we assume have a similar growth profile, we will compute using the formula:
\text{PV} = \text{FCF}_{0} \cdot K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r)
where the DCF factor per 1 unit of current FCF is:
\begin{aligned} & K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r) = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \\ & K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \end{aligned}
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} = 4.61
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} = 3.60
Terminal discount value at t = 10:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} = 7.59
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty = 15.80
Discount all cash flows at r = 11% gives the firm value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bearish}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K = 72.8 \ \text{billion} \times 15.80 \approx 1,150\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bearish}} \approx \frac{1,150\ \text{B}}{13.31\ \text{B}} \approx 86
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} = 5.00
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} = 4.48
Terminal discount value at t = 10:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} = 12.23
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty = 21.71
Discount all cash flows at r = 11% gives the firm value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Base}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K = 72.8 \ \text{billion} \times 21.71 \approx 1,580\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Base}} \approx \frac{1,580\ \text{B}}{13.31\ \text{B}} \approx 119\ \text{per share}
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} = 5.43
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} = 5.57
Terminal discount value at t = 10:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} = 20.58
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty = 31.58
Discount all cash flows at r = 11% gives the firm value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bullish}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K = 72.8 \ \text{billion} \times 21.71 \approx 2,299\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bullish}} \approx \frac{2,299\ \text{B}}{13.31\ \text{B}} \approx 173\ \text{per share}
Using the current share price (around 320 as of 2025-11-28) from the market snapshot above, we can compute the implied margin of safety in each scenario.
| Case | Intrinsic value per share | Current price | Margin of safety | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bearish | 86 | 320 | about -270% | Price ~3.7x bearish value. |
| Base | 119 | 320 | about -170% | Price ~2.7x base value. |
| Bullish | 173 | 320 | about -85% | Price ~1.8x bullish value. |
Margin of safety is defined as 1 - \text{Price} / \text{Intrinsic Value}, expressed as a percentage.
Some points that pop out of the numbers:
Duration effect: Alphabet is a very long-duration asset. A big part of its value comes from years 11 and beyond. Terminal growth and discount rate assumptions therefore have large impact. This is exactly the kind of business where low interest rates and AI enthusiasm can push market prices well above conservative intrinsic value estimates.
Free cash flow vs price: With FCF around 72.8 billion USD and a market cap near 3 trillion USD, the free cash flow yield is very low, under 3 percent.
From a Graham / Buffett perspective, this only makes sense if we assume either:
very high long term FCF growth well above the 10–12 percent band used here, or
a much lower required return r, closer to 6–7 percent, which is essentially accepting a bond-like yield from a tech giant.
Quality vs price: Qualitatively, Alphabet is arguably one of the highest quality businesses on the planet. The problem here is not the business, but the price. The multi-stage FCF model suggests that if we want a 9–11 percent return, the fair value cluster is between roughly 90 and 170 USD per share depending on how optimistic we are about growth and discount rate. The current price of about 320 USD embeds either a lower hurdle rate or stronger growth than we have assumed.
For a strict value investor demanding around 10 percent in USD, this framework would classify Alphabet today as a wonderful business at a demanding price, not a bargain.
Within this Graham / Buffett style framework:
Valuation at 320:
If the objective is to buy high quality businesses at a discount to conservative intrinsic value, this DCF suggests that Alphabet at current levels is in the “hold or avoid” bucket rather than “buy”. It may still be a fine holding if we already own it and accept a lower target return, but as a fresh purchase for a value investor seeking a margin of safety, the numbers do not justify aggressive buying at this price.
Reference Date: December 5, 2025.
PepsiCo is a global consumer staples company with a broad portfolio of beverages (Pepsi, Gatorade, Mountain Dew, SodaStream) and convenient foods (Lay’s, Doritos, Cheetos, Quaker, etc.). It operates through several geographic and product segments that combine beverages and snacks, with a deliberately diversified mix of brands and channels.
From a value investing perspective, PepsiCo is interesting because:
The key question is whether current free cash flow and realistic growth justify a valuation above or below today’s market price.
Public sources report PepsiCo’s free cash flow for fiscal 2024 at around 7.2 billion dollars, with trailing twelve month (TTM) free cash flow as of early September 2025 around 6.8–6.8 billion.
The time series for TTM free cash flow over the last several years fluctuates in a band roughly between 5.5 and 8.0 billion, with a gentle upward trend but noticeable noise from working capital and investment cycles.
To keep the template simple, we take a rounded, normalized figure:
\text{FCF}_{0} \approx 7.0 \ \text{billion}
For the share count, recent filings and data services show common shares outstanding around 1.37 billion as of late 2025. ([MacroTrends][3])
\text{Shares} \approx 1.37\ \text{billion}
PepsiCo carries substantial net debt. Recent balance sheet snapshots indicate net debt around 35–36 billion dollars. ([Yahoo Finance][4])
We treat the free cash flow used here as an equity free cash flow (after interest and maintenance capital expenditure), so the DCF model directly values the equity. The presence of net debt still matters because it reduces financial flexibility and increases sensitivity to shocks, but we do not separately subtract net debt from the DCF result.
At the reference date, the share price is about 145.0 dollars:
P_{\text{market}} \approx 145.0
On this basis, the trailing free cash flow yield is roughly:
\text{FCF Yield} \approx \frac{\text{FCF}_0}{\text{Market Cap}} \approx \frac{7.0}{145.0 \times 1.37} \approx 3.5%
which is consistent with published FCF yield estimates around 3.3–3.4 percent.
We apply the same three stage free cash flow model:
We discount all cash flows at a required return r that reflects a long term equity hurdle for a mature, high quality consumer staple. For a business like PepsiCo, which is less volatile than a typical cyclical but carries leverage, many long term investors might accept a somewhat lower required return than for a fast growing software company.
Conceptually, as before:
r = r_f + \text{Risk Premium}
with a risk free rate r_f around 4–4.5 percent and an equity risk premium bandwidth such that:
PepsiCo’s historical earnings growth from 2015 to 2024 has been around 6–8 percent a year, depending on the exact window and metric. Free cash flow has grown more slowly due to capital spending cycles, so we set forward free cash flow growth assumptions a bit below EPS growth in the base and bearish cases, and closer to EPS trends in the bullish case.
We again use:
\text{PV} = \text{FCF}_{0} \cdot K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r)
where the DCF factor per 1 unit of current FCF is:
\begin{aligned} & K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r) = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \\ & K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \end{aligned}
As for Salesforce, the idea is that once we have K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r) for a band of scenarios, we can reuse those same discount factors for other companies that we believe share a roughly similar growth and risk profile.
We now define three explicit scenarios for PepsiCo: bearish, base and bullish.
Using \text{FCF}_{0} = 7.0\ \text{billion} and \text{Shares} = 1.37\ \text{billion}:
Bearish scenario
This case assumes modest real growth plus inflation, some pressure on margins or mix, and a standard equity hurdle.
Base scenario
This case is anchored on PepsiCo’s long run EPS growth profile (mid single digits) and a slightly lower required return appropriate for a defensive staple with durable brands.
Bullish scenario
This case assumes PepsiCo can sustain growth near the top of its historical EPS range for the next decade, with a terminal growth rate comfortably above long term inflation, and that the investor is content with a 7 percent required return.
Again, these are not forecasts, only structured assumptions for exploring a range of outcomes.
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 4.35
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 3.35
Terminal value discounted back to t = 0:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \approx 8.06
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \approx 15.76
Discounting all cash flows at r = 9% gives the equity value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bearish}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K \approx 7.0\ \text{B} \times 15.76 \approx 110\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bearish}} \approx \frac{110\ \text{B}}{1.37\ \text{B}} \approx 81\ \text{per share}
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 4.66
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 3.98
Terminal value:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \approx 12.52
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \approx 21.16
Discounting all cash flows at r = 8% gives:
\text{PV}_{\text{Base}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K \approx 7.0\ \text{B} \times 21.16 \approx 148\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Base}} \approx \frac{148\ \text{B}}{1.37\ \text{B}} \approx 108\ \text{per share}
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 5.00
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 4.73
Terminal value:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \approx 20.73
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \approx 30.45
Discounting all cash flows at r = 7% gives:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bullish}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K \approx 7.0\ \text{B} \times 30.45 \approx 213\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bullish}} \approx \frac{213\ \text{B}}{1.37\ \text{B}} \approx 156\ \text{per share}
Using the current share price of 145.0 dollars as of 2025 12 05, we can compute the implied margin of safety in each scenario.
| Case | Intrinsic value per share | Current price | Margin of safety | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bearish | 81 | 145.0 | -80% | Price far above bearish value, little downside cushion. |
| Base | 108 | 145.0 | -34% | Price well above base case DCF value. |
| Bullish | 156 | 145.0 | +7% | Modest discount if very optimistic and accept 7% (r). |
Margin of safety is defined as 1 - \text{Price} / \text{Intrinsic Value}, expressed as a percentage.
Some observations:
The spread between bearish (81) and bullish (156) per share is wide. This reflects the long duration of a stable consumer franchise plus the large effect of changing the required return from 9 percent to 7 percent.
Under the base case, with r = 8% and mid single digit free cash flow growth, PepsiCo appears materially overvalued. A long term holder demanding an 8 percent equity return would prefer an entry price closer to 110 than 145.
The current price of roughly 145 sits slightly below the bullish intrinsic value. In this scenario the investor is implicitly assuming:
In Graham / Buffett language, PEP looks like a very high quality, durable franchise that currently trades at a full to rich price relative to an 8–10 percent required return. It only looks reasonably valued if one is willing to accept a low single digit real return and assumes that brand strength and pricing power will hold for a very long time.
Compared with a higher growth compounder such as Salesforce, PepsiCo offers:
Within this framework:
For a disciplined value investor using a Buffett style required return:
Reference Date: December 5, 2025.
The Coca-Cola Company is one of the leading global consumer staples franchises, built around a portfolio of non-alcoholic beverages including Coca-Cola, Coke Zero, Fanta, Sprite, Minute Maid, Powerade and many regional brands. The operating model is a mix of concentrate sales and bottling partnerships, which together create a very high margin, asset-light core business on the parent company level.
From a value-investing perspective, Coca-Cola is interesting because:
The question is whether current “owner earnings” and realistic growth assumptions justify a valuation above or below today’s market price.
Recent data show:
Given that the 2024–2025 dip is largely driven by a tax deposit and working-capital swings rather than a collapse in the underlying franchise, a Buffett-style “owner earnings” approach would adjust for these one-off items. For this template, we use a normalized free cash flow:
\text{FCF}_{0} \approx 10\ \text{billion}
which is roughly in line with the multi-year average before the IRS deposit.
For the share count, recent sources show common shares outstanding around 4.30–4.31 billion as of late 2025. We will use:
\text{Shares} \approx 4.30\ \text{billion}
Coca-Cola carries meaningful leverage. Net debt is in the low to mid 30 billions, with long-term debt around 42–43 billion USD and net debt metrics indicating a steady, but not minimal, debt load.
We treat the normalized free cash flow here as equity free cash flow (after interest and maintenance capex), so the DCF model values the equity directly and we do not subtract net debt separately. The leverage still matters qualitatively in choosing the required return.
At the reference date, the stock trades around:
P_{\text{market}} \approx 70.0\ \text{USD}
based on closing prices and FCF-yield statistics for December 5, 2025.
On this basis:
giving:
\text{FCF Yield (TTM)} \approx \frac{1.29}{70} \approx 1.9% \text{FCF Yield (normalized)} \approx \frac{2.32}{70} \approx 3.3%
These yields are low for an equity investment, even in a defensive staple.
We apply the same three stage free cash flow model used for Salesforce and PepsiCo:
All cash flows are discounted at a required return r that reflects a long term equity hurdle for a mature, high quality consumer staple with leverage.
Conceptually:
r = r_f + \text{Risk Premium}
with a risk free rate r_f around 4–4.5 percent.
The equity risk premium that leads to:
As before:
\text{PV} = \text{FCF}_{0} \cdot K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r)
where the DCF factor per 1 unit of current FCF is:
\begin{aligned} & K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r) = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \\ & K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \end{aligned}
This gives a simple reusable “Buffett factor” K(\cdot) that converts current free cash flow into an estimate of equity value under a specified growth and discount profile.
We now define three scenarios for Coca-Cola: bearish, base and bullish.
Using \text{FCF}_{0} = 10\ \text{billion} and \text{Shares} = 4.30\ \text{billion}:
Bearish scenario
This assumes growth roughly in line with inflation plus a little real expansion, with modest pressure on margins and mix, and a standard equity hurdle for a leveraged staple.
Base scenario
This tracks Coca-Cola’s long run revenue and EPS growth (mid single digits) and treats the stock as a quality consumer staple where an 8 percent nominal return is acceptable.
Bullish scenario
This assumes that Coca-Cola can sustain growth near the top of its historical EPS band for a decade, with terminal growth above long term inflation, and that the investor is content with a 7 percent hurdle.
These are structured assumptions, not forecasts.
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 4.35
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 3.35
Terminal leg:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \approx 8.06
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \approx 15.76
With r = 9% and \text{FCF}_{0} = 10\ \text{B} the equity value is:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bearish}} = 10\ \text{B} \times 15.76 \approx 158\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bearish}} \approx \frac{158\ \text{B}}{4.30\ \text{B}} \approx 36.7\ \text{USD per share}
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 4.66
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 3.98
Terminal leg:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \approx 12.52
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \approx 21.16
Discounting at r = 8%:
\text{PV}_{\text{Base}} = 10\ \text{B} \times 21.16 \approx 212\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Base}} \approx \frac{212\ \text{B}}{4.30\ \text{B}} \approx 49\ \text{USD per share}
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 5.00
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 4.73
Terminal leg:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \approx 20.73
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \approx 30.45
Discounting at r = 7%:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bullish}} = 10\ \text{B} \times 30.45 \approx 305\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bullish}} \approx \frac{305\ \text{B}}{4.30\ \text{B}} \approx 71\ \text{USD per share}
Using the current share price of about 70.0 USD as of 2025-12-05, we can compute the implied margin of safety in each scenario.
| Case | Intrinsic value per share | Current price | Margin of safety | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bearish | 37 | 70.0 | -91% | Price far above conservative value. |
| Base | 49 | 70.0 | -42% | Price well above base case DCF value. |
| Bullish | 71 | 70.0 | +1% | Roughly fair only under optimistic growth and low r. |
Margin of safety is defined as 1 - \text{Price} / \text{Intrinsic Value}, expressed as a percentage.
Key points:
The range between bearish (about 37) and bullish (about 71) per share is wide, which reflects both the long duration of the Coca-Cola franchise and how sensitive valuation is to the required return.
Under the base case (normalized FCF 10B, 5.5 percent growth for five years, 4 percent for the next five, 2 percent terminal, r = 8%), Coca-Cola appears materially overvalued at 70. The price implies something closer to the bullish scenario.
The bullish case effectively assumes:
Comparison with PepsiCo:
Within this framework:
For a Buffett style value investor using this template:
Reference Date: December 5, 2025.
Bausch Health is a diversified pharmaceutical and medical-device company with cash-generating franchises in gastroenterology, dermatology, neurology and aesthetics, and a controlling stake in Bausch + Lomb. Although the operating businesses are profitable and deliver substantial cash flow, the group carries a very large debt load inherited from the former Valeant structure.
From a value-investing perspective, BHC is not a traditional compounder. Instead, it is a leveraged special situation where equity is effectively a residual claim on a business that produces strong cash flow but is constrained by heavy leverage and refinancing risk.
The core question is whether the current free cash flow justifies a materially higher equity value, and whether the capital structure allows equity holders to realize it.
Recent data indicate a normalized free cash flow (after interest and maintenance capex):
\text{FCF}_{0} \approx 1.1\ \text{billion}
Shares outstanding:
\text{Shares} \approx 373\ \text{million}
Total debt around 21 billion and net debt roughly 20 billion, implying a highly leveraged balance sheet.
At a market price around 6.93 USD, the equity market capitalization is approximately 2.6 billion USD, implying an equity free cash flow yield exceeding 40%.
This is not a normal valuation for a stable cash-flowing business, and reflects the perceived risk of the capital structure.
We apply the same three-stage free-cash-flow framework used for compounders, but use significantly higher discount rates to reflect credit and refinancing risk.
\text{PV} = \text{FCF}_{0} \cdot K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r)
We use the discount rates:
Growth assumptions are intentionally modest (0–3 percent), reflecting a conservative view of the operating trajectory.
We fix:
\text{FCF}_{0} = 1.1\ \text{billion}, \quad \text{Shares} = 373\ \text{million}
and use three scenarios with modest or zero growth (no heroic assumptions) combined with high discount rates:
Bearish scenario (flat, distressed-type hurdle)
Base scenario (a little growth, high hurdle)
Bullish scenario (modest growth, more normal hurdle)
These are intentionally conservative relative to what we might assume for CRM or KO: the risk is not about lack of growth, but about whether bondholders get paid without a restructuring.
Here we assume no growth forever and require 20 percent per year on equity.
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+0)^{t}}{(1+0.20)^t} \approx 2.99
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+0)^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+0)^{t-5}}{(1+0.20)^t} \approx 1.20
Terminal part:
K_\infty = (1+0)^{5}(1+0)^{5} \frac{(1+0)}{(0.20 - 0)(1+0.20)^{10}} \approx 0.81
Total DCF factor:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \approx 5.00
This matches the simple intuition for a flat perpetuity: K \approx 1/r = 1/0.20 = 5.
Equity value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bearish}} = 1.1\ \text{B} \times 5.00 \approx 5.5\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bearish}} \approx \frac{5.5\ \text{B}}{373\ \text{M}} \approx 14.75\ \text{USD per share}
Here we allow a little growth in the next 5 years, then flat, and require 15 percent per year.
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+0.02)^{t}}{(1+0.15)^t} \approx 3.54
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+0.02)^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+0)^{t-5}}{(1+0.15)^t} \approx 1.84
Terminal part:
K_\infty = (1+0.02)^{5}(1+0)^{5} \frac{(1+0)}{(0.15 - 0)(1+0.15)^{10}} \approx 1.82
Total:
K \approx 3.54 + 1.84 + 1.82 \approx 7.20
Firm value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Base}} = 1.1\ \text{B} \times 7.20 \approx 7.92\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Base}} \approx \frac{7.92\ \text{B}}{373\ \text{M}} \approx 21.2\ \text{USD per share}
Here we assume modest long term growth and use a 10 percent required return, similar to a normal equity hurdle, but still below what we might use for a high quality compounder.
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+0.03)^{t}}{(1+0.10)^t} \approx 4.12
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+0.03)^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+0.02)^{t-5}}{(1+0.10)^t} \approx 2.89
Terminal part:
K_\infty = (1+0.03)^{5}(1+0.02)^{5} \frac{(1+0.01)}{(0.10 - 0.01)(1+0.10)^{10}} \approx 5.54
Total:
K \approx 4.12 + 2.89 + 5.54 \approx 12.55
Firm value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bullish}} = 1.1\ \text{B} \times 12.55 \approx 13.81\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bullish}} \approx \frac{13.81\ \text{B}}{373\ \text{M}} \approx 37.0\ \text{USD per share}
| Case | Intrinsic value per share | Market price | Margin of safety |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bearish | ~14.75 | 6.93 | 53% |
| Base | ~21.2 | 6.93 | 67% |
| Bullish | ~37.0 | 6.93 | 81% |
Even at a 20% required return with zero growth, the equity screens as undervalued relative to the free cash flow of the business.
This DCF result must be interpreted with caution:
In 2025, Paulson & Co. acquired Carl Icahn’s ~35M shares, lifting Paulson’s stake to ≈19% of the company. Bausch Health has thus become one of Paulson’s largest fund holdings, representing nearly half a billion dollars of exposure. This creates unusually strong alignment: the chairman himself is heavily invested, and the equity outcome now matters materially for his fund’s performance.
This improves governance stability but does not change the reality that the capital structure remains highly leveraged.
Within this framework:
A realistic conclusion for a value-oriented investor is that BHC offers substantial upside if cash flows remain intact and leverage is managed, but carries a genuine risk of total loss. It is appropriate as a small, speculative position — not as part of the compounder portfolio.
Reference Date: December 9, 2025.
Exxon Mobil is one of the largest integrated oil and gas companies in the world, with operations spanning upstream (exploration and production), downstream (refining and marketing), chemicals and low-carbon initiatives. It is a classic capital-intensive, commodity-linked business: earnings and cash flows are strongly influenced by crude oil and gas prices, refining margins and project timing.
From a value-investing perspective, Exxon is interesting because:
Compared with a software “compounder” like Salesforce, Exxon’s business is more cyclical and capital intensive, with lower structural growth but very high cash generation in good commodity environments.
The key question is whether current free cash flow and realistic long-run growth justify today’s equity price.
Recent filings and data sources report trailing-twelve-month (TTM) free cash flow for Exxon Mobil, as of 30 September 2025, around 23.8 billion dollars:
\text{FCF}_{\text{TTM}} \approx 23.8 \ \text{billion}
This follows several years of elevated free cash flow (30–60 billion) driven by high oil prices post-2021. To avoid anchoring purely on the peak years while still using current conditions, we round to a simple normalized figure close to the latest TTM:
\text{FCF}_{0} \approx 24 \ \text{billion}
Shares outstanding are around 4.28 billion as of late 2025, reflecting ongoing buybacks:
\text{Shares} \approx 4.28\ \text{billion}
Net debt (total debt minus cash and equivalents) is reported around 28 billion dollars: total debt roughly 42 billion and cash about 13.8–14 billion:
\text{Net Debt} \approx 28\ \text{billion}
At the reference price:
\text{Market Cap} \approx 118.25 \times 4.28 \approx 506\ \text{billion}
This implies a trailing free cash flow yield of:
\text{FCF Yield} \approx \frac{\text{FCF}_0}{\text{Market Cap}} \approx \frac{24}{118.25 \times 4.28} \approx 4.7%
which is consistent with external estimates of a 4.5–5 percent FCF yield.
Given Exxon’s leverage and capital-intensive nature, we treat this 24 billion as equity free cash flow (after interest and sustaining capex), and we value the equity directly. The net-debt level still informs our choice of discount rate and risk assumptions.
We apply exactly the same three-stage free-cash-flow model used for Salesforce and PepsiCo.
All cash flows are discounted at a required return r reflecting a long-term equity hurdle for a large, cyclical, investment-grade energy company.
For Exxon:
r_f \approx 4% \text{ to } 4.5%
We use:
As for CRM and PEP, we parametrize the model as:
\text{PV} = \text{FCF}_{0} \cdot K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r)
where the DCF factor per 1 unit of current FCF is:
\begin{aligned} & K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r) = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \\ & K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \end{aligned}
The key difference from Salesforce is in the growth profile: Exxon is not a structural 10–12 percent compounder; long-term growth in owner earnings should be modest, and highly path-dependent on commodity cycles and capital allocation.
We define three explicit scenarios: bearish, base and bullish.
Using \text{FCF}_{0} = 24\ \text{billion} and \text{Shares} = 4.28\ \text{billion}:
Bearish scenario (low growth, high discount)
This represents a world where today’s FCF is near the top of the cycle and normalized long-run growth is essentially flat.
Base scenario (modest real growth)
Here we allow for some volume and margin tailwinds from Guyana and other projects, but assume that over a decade the energy transition caps growth at low single digits in nominal terms after inflation.
Bullish scenario (sustained favorable environment)
This assumes a relatively tight oil market, good project execution, and disciplined capital returns so that FCF can grow modestly above inflation for a long time, with investors willing to accept a somewhat lower required return.
Again, these are not forecasts; they are structured assumptions to interrogate a range of outcomes.
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 3.70
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 2.19
Terminal discount value at t = 10:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \approx 3.37
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \approx 9.26
Discounting all cash flows at r = 11% gives the equity value:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bearish}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K \approx 24\ \text{B} \times 9.26 \approx 222\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bearish}} \approx \frac{222\ \text{B}}{4.28\ \text{B}} \approx 52\ \text{per share}
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 4.07
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 2.78
Terminal discount value:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \approx 5.27
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \approx 12.12
Discounting all cash flows at r = 10% gives:
\text{PV}_{\text{Base}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K \approx 24\ \text{B} \times 12.12 \approx 291\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Base}} \approx \frac{291\ \text{B}}{4.28\ \text{B}} \approx 68\ \text{per share}
Stage 1:
K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 4.35
Stage 2:
K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \approx 3.30
Terminal discount value:
K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \approx 7.87
Therefore:
K = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \approx 15.52
Discounting all cash flows at r = 9% gives:
\text{PV}_{\text{Bullish}} = \text{FCF}_{0} \times K \approx 24\ \text{B} \times 15.52 \approx 373\ \text{billion}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bullish}} \approx \frac{373\ \text{B}}{4.28\ \text{B}} \approx 87\ \text{per share}
Using the current share price of 118.25 dollars, the implied margin of safety in each scenario is:
| Case | Intrinsic value per share | Current price | Margin of safety | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bearish | 52 | 118.25 | -128% | Price vastly above bearish value; no downside cushion. |
| Base | 68 | 118.25 | -74% | Price well above base-case DCF value at a 10% hurdle. |
| Bullish | 87 | 118.25 | -36% | Still a premium even under optimistic growth and 9% (r). |
Margin of safety is defined as:
\text{MoS} = 1 - \frac{\text{Price}}{\text{Intrinsic Value}}
expressed as a percentage.
Some observations:
In Graham / Buffett terms, Exxon today resembles:
Within this Warren Buffett-style framework:
For a disciplined value investor using this template:
Reference Date: December 16, 2025.
ServiceNow is a leading enterprise software company focused on digital workflows (IT service management, employee workflows, customer workflows, and broader enterprise automation). It sells primarily subscription products with high renewal rates and growing platform breadth, and it is investing heavily in AI features and data/automation capabilities that aim to expand its share of enterprise software spend.
From a value-investing angle, ServiceNow often looks excellent on business quality (recurring revenue, strong unit economics, durable enterprise relationships). The recurring question is whether the entry price offers an equity-like return for a long-term owner.
ServiceNow reported 2024 free cash flow of:
\text{FCF}_{0} \approx 3.455 \ \text{billion}
Weighted-average diluted shares for 2024 were:
\text{Shares} \approx 208.423 \ \text{million}
As of December 31, 2024, ServiceNow reported:
So “cash + investments” is about 9.9B, and a simple “net cash” approximation (cash+investments minus long-term debt) is about 8.4B, which is roughly 40 per diluted share.
Important corporate action
A 5-for-1 stock split was approved, with record date December 16, 2025, distribution after market close around December 17, 2025, and split-adjusted trading expected to begin December 18, 2025. This analysis uses the pre-split price/share figures; post-split, both price and intrinsic value per share scale by 1/5.
We apply the same three-stage free-cash-flow model:
We discount at the required return r.
We use:
\text{PV} = \text{FCF}_{0} \cdot K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r)
where the DCF factor per 1 unit of current FCF is:
\begin{aligned} & K(g_{1},g_{2},g_{\infty},r) = K_1 + K_2 + K_\infty \\ & K_1 = \sum_{t=1}^{5} \frac{(1+g_{1})^{t}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_2 = (1+g_{1})^{5} \sum_{t=6}^{10} \frac{(1+g_{2})^{t-5}}{(1+r)^t} \\ & K_\infty = (1+g_{1})^{5}(1+g_{2})^{5} \frac{(1+g_{\infty})}{(r - g_{\infty})(1+r)^{10}} \end{aligned}
We reuse the same discount-rate scenarios as CRM (so the same K factors):
We use:
\text{FCF}_{0} = 3.455\ \text{B}, \qquad \text{Shares} = 208.423\ \text{M}.
Bearish scenario
Base scenario
Bullish scenario
\text{PV}_{\text{Bearish}} = 3.455 \times 15.80 \approx 54.6\ \text{B}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bearish}} \approx \frac{54.6\ \text{B}}{208.423\ \text{M}} \approx 262
\text{PV}_{\text{Base}} = 3.455 \times 21.71 \approx 75.0\ \text{B}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Base}} \approx \frac{75.0\ \text{B}}{208.423\ \text{M}} \approx 360
\text{PV}_{\text{Bullish}} = 3.455 \times 31.58 \approx 109.1\ \text{B}
Per share:
\text{Value}_{\text{Bullish}} \approx \frac{109.1\ \text{B}}{208.423\ \text{M}} \approx 524
Using P_{0}\approx 781.12:
| Case | Intrinsic value per share | Current price | Margin of safety | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bearish | 262 | 781 | about -198% | Price ~3.0x bearish value |
| Base | 360 | 781 | about -117% | Price ~2.2x base value |
| Bullish | 524 | 781 | about -49% | Price ~1.5x bullish value |
Margin of safety is defined as 1 - \text{Price}/\text{Intrinsic Value}.
Within this Graham/Buffett-style framework (same discount-factor set as our CRM/GOOGL template):
Classification: wonderful business at a demanding price.